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Abstract. We ﬁnd an economic rationale for the common sense an-
swer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the
contracting parties write.
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for
an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties
would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the
parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance.
We study a buyer-seller model with asymmetric information and ex-ante
investments, in which some contingencies cannot be contracted on. The court
must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it.
The parties know their private information at the time of contracting, and
this drives a wedge between ex-ante and interim-eﬃcient contracts. In par-
ticular, some types pool in equilibrium. By voiding some contracts that the
pooling types would like the court to enforce, the court is able to induce them
to separate, and hence to improve ex-ante welfare.
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1. Introduction
It is self-evident that courts are active players in contractual relationships between
economic agents. They routinely intervene in contractual disputes, excusing perfor-
mance called for in the contract because of intervening events. Yet, in most of modern
economic theory courts are treated (often not even modelled, but left in the back-
ground) as passive enforcers of the will of the parties embodied in their contractual
agreements.
This simplistic view of the role of courts stems from the fact that in a world with
complete contracts, to behave as a passive enforcer is clearly the best that a court
that is interested in maximizing contracting parties’ welfare can do. In the “classical”
world of modern economic theory, contracts are complete.
In a world in which complete contracts are not feasible it is no longer obvious that
a court should be a passive enforcer, and in fact it is no longer true. For example, the
contracting parties may face some uninsurable risk and the court may improve their
welfare if it is able to use some information available ex-post and excuse performance
in some eventualities.1
Once the way for an active court is open, a host of related questions naturally
arise. The aim of this paper is to address the following question. Suppose that the
parties, at the time of contracting, were able to communicate eﬀectively to the court
how they would like the court to act in response to (ex-post) information that they
are not able to take into account in their agreement. Is it then the case that the
parties would ask the court to behave according to the same rules that would be
chosen by a welfare-maximizing court?
The answer to the question above is “no” if the parties are asymmetrically in-
formed at the time they contract and the court maximizes their ex-ante welfare,
that is, their expected welfare before either party gets information not available to
the other. Asymmetry in parties’ information at the time they contract can lead
to a “lemons-like” situation in which adverse selection leads to ineﬃcient contracts.
1This is the case, for instance, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2003).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 2
Courts that do not simply enforce contracts as they are written can sometimes ame-
liorate the ineﬃciency that results from asymmetric information.
We show in the paper that in a world where contracting parties are asymmetrically
informed this is indeed the case. We also derive the optimal decision rule for a welfare-
maximizing court. This rule implies that the court in equilibrium voids contracts that
the contracting parties (at the contracting stage) would like the court to enforce. In
other words, the conﬂict of interest between the parties and the court leads the court
to actively intervene in the parties’ contractual relationship and void contractual
clauses explicitly included in the contract.
The potential beneﬁt of a court’s voiding explicit contractual clauses stems from
asymmetry of information between the parties at the time they contract. We deal
with the case in which one of the contracting parties may or may not have private in-
formation relevant to the other party; furthermore, the presence or absence of private
information is itself private information. The possibility that one of the parties may
have relevant private information will have a deleterious eﬀect on contracting even
when, in fact, that party does not have private information. In other words, the cases
in which private information exists generates an externality on the cases in which
there is no private information. This negative external eﬀect can be ameliorated by
providing incentives for a party with private information to disclose that information
at the time of contracting. One way to provide such incentives is to void a contract
when, ex-post, the belief is that there was such relevant private information. Void-
ing contracts in such cases will decrease the expected gain from withholding private
information, thereby promoting disclosure. Such ex-post inferences will, of course,
be imperfect; contracts between parties where there was no private information will
sometimes be voided. There will be a net welfare gain when the improvement from
the additional disclosure outweighs the ineﬃciency from voiding contracts when there
was no private information.
The view that courts should maximize ex-ante welfare is a compelling one. If the
parties were able to meet at the ex-ante stage (when they are symmetrically informed)
agreements could be reached that circumvent ineﬃciencies that are unavoidable atShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 3
the interim stage when the parties have private information. A court that maximizes
ex-ante expected welfare will choose the same contingent rules of behavior as the
parties would have chosen at that stage, were it possible. In other words, if the
parties could meet at that point, they might instruct the court to void some contracts
they might subsequently write. They will do this precisely because the parties will
understand that while they may regret this in some circumstances, it may promote
the disclosure of private information. This disclosure may increase the eﬃciency of
contracting to an extent that more than outweighs any negative consequences of the
court’s intervention. The problem that the court is solving is that the parties are
often unable to meet before the arrival of their private information. A court that
maximizes ex-ante welfare acts as a commitment device that remedies the parties’
inability to contract at the ex-ante stage.
1.1. The Role of Courts in Promoting Disclosure of Information
Courts have had an interest in promoting disclosure of information at least since the
English case of Hadley vs. Baxendale in 1854.2 The court held in that case that a
defendant who breached a contract was liable only for damages that might reasonably
have arisen given the known facts rather than the higher damages that were actually
suﬀered because of circumstances known only to the plaintiﬀ. As argued in Adler
(1999), the limitation on damages implicit in the Hadley rule is a default that is often
viewed as promoting disclosure: “A party who will suﬀer exceptional damages from
breach need only communicate her situation in advance and gain assent to allowance
so that the damages are unmistakably in the contemplation of both parties’ at the
time of contract.”3 The discussion of the role of courts in promoting information
disclosure, to our knowledge, focusses primarily on the beneﬁt of disclosure to the
contracting parties. In the absence of disclosure, resources will be wasted in writing
needless waiver clauses and ineﬃcient precaution.
29 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145. (Court of Exchequer, 1854).
3See Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) for a discussion of the Hadley
rule and it’s role in promoting disclosure.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 4
Courts will have an interest in promoting disclosure of information in our model,
but for a very diﬀerent reason, and with very diﬀerent consequences. Courts will
aﬀect the amount of information that is revealed by informed parties through their
treatment of contracts that reveal little information. While contracts may reveal little
information simply because the parties have little information, courts will treat such
contracts more harshly than they otherwise might because of the incentive eﬀects
such treatment will have on informed parties. Those with relevant information will
reveal it in order that courts will more likely enforce the agreements that are made.
Thus, courts are not examining a contract brought before them solely to uncover the
parties’ intent. They also take into consideration how the treatment of the contract
will aﬀect contracting parties diﬀerent from the ones before them.
1.2. Related Literature
There is a growing literature that explicitly models the role of courts in contractual
relationships. Bond (2003) and Usman (2002) model the agency problems (moral-
hazard) that stem from hidden actions that the court itself can take. Bond (2003)
analyzes optimal contracting between parties when judges can impose an outcome
other than the contracted outcome in exchange for a bribe. Bond shows that in a
simple agency model, this possibility will make the contracting parties less likely to
employ high-powered contracts. Usman (2002) lays out a model in which contracts
contain variables that are not observable to courts unless a rational and self-interested
judge exerts costly eﬀort. Usman analyzes contracting behavior and the incentive to
breach when judges value the correct ruling but dislike eﬀort.
The courts in these papers are governed by a judge who maximizes his or her
personal utility. In contrast to these papers, there is a literature that analyzes courts
that maximize the expected welfare of the contracting parties. Posner (1998) analyzes
whether a court should consider information extrinsic to the contract in interpreting
the contract. Closer to the current paper, Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk
and Shavell (1991) analyze the degree to which courts’ interpretation of contracts
aﬀect incentives to reveal private information. The focus of this work is the eﬀect ofShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 5
diﬀerent court rules regarding damages for breach of contract on the incentives for
parties to disclose information regarding the costs of breach at the time of contracting.
The model in the present paper is similar to that in Anderlini, Felli, and Postle-
waite (2003). Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite analyze the design of a welfare-maximi-
zing court that actively determines circumstances in which a contract will be voided in
order to provide insurance against unforeseen contingencies. Shavell (2003) presents
a general examination of the role of courts in interpreting contracts. The primary
focus of this paper is on how courts should interpret contracts that have speciﬁc terms
compared to the interpretation of more general terms.
The present paper analyzes the role of a welfare-maximizing court that can aﬀect
the type of contracts that are written by excusing performance (voiding the contract)
in some circumstances. The possibility of welfare improvements are a consequence
of the eﬀect of the court’s rules for enforcing contracts on the parties’ incentives to
reveal private information. Unlike Ayres and Gertner (1989), Bebchuk and Shavell
(1991) and Shavell (2003), our focus is on the externality that informed contracting
parties may impose on uninformed contracting parties, which is absent from these
papers.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We present the model in Section
2, and our results in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. For ease of
exposition all proofs have been gathered in the Appendix.4
2. The Model
2.1. Uninformed Buyers
The uninformed buyers are risk-neutral and face two sources of uncertainty. The
“state” can be either “risky” or “safe”.5 These two possibilities are embodied in
4In the numbering of Propositions, Lemmas, equations and so on, a preﬁx of “A” indicates that
the relevant item can be found in the Appendix.
5Note that we are abusing the standard meaning of the word “state” as a “complete description”
of all relevant uncertainty since the realization of a second random variable is involved in determining
the complete description of the parties’ uncertain environment.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 6
the realization of a random variable θ that takes values in the set Θ = {R,S} with
probabilities πR, and πS = 1 − πR respectively.
In the safe state, the value and cost of the widget are given by vS and cS respec-
tively, with vS − cS = ∆ > 0.
The second source of uncertainty is that in the risky state, the cost and the value
of the widget can be either “high” or “low.” We represent this uncertainty by a
random variable σ that takes values in the discrete set {H,L} with probabilities q
and 1 − q respectively. Critically, the uncertainty associated with θ is contractible,
while the uncertainty associated with σ is not.
Given a realization of θ = R and σ ∈ {H,L}, the cost and value of the widget
are denoted by cσ and vσ respectively.6 For simplicity we assume that the gains from
trade are constant, so cH > cL and
vS − cS = vH − cH = vL − cL = ∆ > 0 (1)
Of course, since ∆ > 0, this implies that it is always eﬃcient to trade. This assump-
tion is made for tractability. Our results would not qualitatively change if the costs
and beneﬁts were not perfectly correlated and the magnitude of the gains from trade
were variable. Finally, we denote:
q cH + (1 − q)cL = c and q vH + (1 − q)vL = v (2)
2.2. Informed Buyers
The informed buyers are also risk-neutral and are fully informed. For simplicity, we
assume that all informed buyers observe the same realization of θ and σ — namely
θ = R and σ = H. To put it another way, the informed buyers are all of the same
type. They know that the cost and value are cH and vH respectively.7
6Notice that we are slightly abusing notation since we use θ and σ again to denote generic realized
values of the two random variables.
7Thus it may be argued that our use of the labels “uninformed” and “informed” buyers is some-
what improper. The “uninformed” buyers do in fact know that they are uninformed about theShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 7
Notice that because of our assumption that θ is contractible, the informed buyers
can credibly reveal that they are informed. They need not do so, however. As will be
clear below, under some conditions, they may opt to pretend to be uninformed, and
hence not to reveal their information about cost and value.
Our assumption that all informed buyers are of type (R,H) is obviously strong.
However, we proceed in this way purely for the sake of (mostly notational) simplicity.
The qualitative nature of our results would be largely unchanged if we allowed the
informed buyers to observe with positive probability all possible combinations of the
realizations of θ and σ.
2.3. Sellers
All sellers are uninformed. They face uncertainty about both θ and σ. Of course,
the probabilities with which they evaluate the uncertainty they face depends on the
equilibrium behavior of the informed buyers. In particular, the sellers will take into
account whether the informed buyers pool with the uninformed by oﬀering the same
contract or whether they separate and reveal their type.
Sellers are risk-averse. They maximize the expected value of a strictly increasing
and concave function V : R → R such that V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0.8 Hence V must be
unbounded below. We also assume that V is bounded above by V .
2.4. Bargaining Power and Relationship-Speciﬁc Investment
We posit that the buyer has all the bargaining power ex-ante when a contract is
proposed. In other words, the equilibrium contract is the result of a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer from the buyer to the seller. Ex-post, in some instances, renegotiation will
take place. We assume that the seller has all the bargaining power in the ex-post
cost and value of the widget. We proceed in this way since we think that these terms facilitate the
exposition.
8We let V be deﬁned on negative values of wealth because we want to be able to consider
contracts that, with some probability, give the seller a net loss. Deﬁning V over the entire real line
is a particularly simple way to accomplish this. Our results would be unchanged if we kept track
of the seller’s initial endowment, assumed that it is large enough to cover any losses, and deﬁned V
over the non-negative reals.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 8
renegotiation: if renegotiation occurs, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the buyer.9
To summarize, the uninformed parties face a risk at the time they contract that
the cost and value of the widget will be high or low at the time production and delivery
are to take place. This risk can be avoided by not contracting ex-ante, and simply
contracting after the state is realized. To provide a beneﬁt to contracting ex-ante, we
assume that the buyer (whether informed or uninformed) can undertake an ex-ante,
non-contractible relationship-speciﬁc, investment e ∈ [0,1] at a cost ψ(e); we assume
that ψ is convex, ψ(0) = ψ0(0) = 0 and lim
e→1ψ
0(e) = +∞. A buyer’s investment of
e increases the value to him of the widget of an amount eY . Consequently, if the
buyer chooses the level of relationship-speciﬁc investment e his value of the widget is
eY + ∆ + ci with i ∈ {S,H,L}, depending on his type.
2.5. The Court
The court acts as a “Stackelberg leader” in the model. Before any uncertainty is
realized and any contracts are drawn up, the court publicly announces the rules that
it will follow to settle a possible dispute. courts do not in actuality commit to the
rules by which disputes will be settled; instead, courts decide after they know the
details of the dispute. Nevertheless, over time the accumulated decisions that courts
have made in a broad array of cases creates a set of precedents that shape how future
disputes will be settled. Rather than model this gradual evolution to the rule by
which contractual disputes are resolved we treat the court as choosing, once and for
all, a rule.
The court chooses the rule for settling possible disputes so as to maximize the
parties’ expected ex-ante welfare. In other words, the court maximizes welfare under
9The assumption that both ex-ante and ex-post, one or the other of the parties has all the
bargaining power is primarily for expositional ease; none of our results depends on bargaining power
being absolute for one or the other. Our results would not hold, however, if the buyer has all
the bargaining power ex-post. In this case, clearly the incentive problem disappears in our model.
Trading ex-post would always implement eﬃcient risk-sharing and ex-ante investment. When the
seller has any bargaining power ex-post, a trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk-sharing appears.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 9
a veil of ignorance: it does not observe the parties’ types and hence “averages” across
all possibilities.
After all uncertainty is realized, each party to the contract can bring the other
party to court, and the court will rule on the status of the contract. This ruling con-
sists of the court’s decision to void (alternatively, excuse performance) or to enforce
(alternatively uphold) the contract, and is based on the information available to the
court: the contract itself, and the value of θ. We assume that the court lacks the “de-
tailed knowledge” to eﬀectively use and manipulate price information. In particular
we do not allow the court to force the parties to trade at a given price determined by
the court herself. Moreover, we do not consider court rules that make the decision to
void or uphold contingent on the actual price that a contract speciﬁes, but only on
the contract “type” itself.10 Finally, we do not allow the court to utilize a message
game in which the parties are required to report their information to the court, as in
Maskin and Tirole (1999).11
If the court voids the existing contract, renegotiation takes place between the
buyer and the seller. Recall that at this stage the seller has all the bargaining power.
2.6. Timeline
The timeline of decisions and events in our model is as follows. First, the court
chooses a rule for voiding or upholding contracts. The rule chosen by the court is
contingent on what it will observe when any contract is taken to court: the contract
type,12 and the realized value of θ.
10There are two contract “types” that the buyer can oﬀer to the seller. One type of contract is
the one oﬀered by uninformed buyers and by those informed buyers who pretend to be uninformed,
and another type is the one oﬀered by informed buyers who declare to be informed.
11There are a variety of other factors on which one could imagine that the court may want to
condition its decision to void or enforce; for instance the identity of the plaintiﬀ — the party who
takes the contract to the court.
In practice, allowing for court rules that can depend on prices or plaintiﬀ identity would not alter
the qualitative nature of our results. We proceed in this way because this simpliﬁes the model and
because we ﬁnd it convincing to stipulate that the court rule must be to some extent “detail-free.”
What is, of course, critical is that we are ruling out the possibility that going to court might
trigger an ex-post extensive-form implementation game ` a la Moore and Repullo (1988).
12See footnote 10 above.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 10
Next, there is a draw by Nature that determines the buyer’s type, that is, whether
the buyer is informed or uninformed. This draw is embodied in the random variable
η that takes values in T = {I,U}. The realization of η is I (for “informed”) with
probability γ and U (for “uninformed”) with probability 1 − γ.
If η = I, the cost and value of the widget are determined as cH and vH respectively.
If η = U, then the cost and value of the widget are given by the realizations of θ and
σ; the state can be either risky or safe and if it is risky the cost and value can be
either high or low.
The buyer now observes the realization of η. So, the informed buyer knows that
he is informed (and hence the cost and value — cH and vH), while the uninformed
buyer knows that he is uninformed: he observes the realization η = U, but not the
realized values of θ and σ. The buyer (informed or uninformed) makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer of a contract to the seller. Note that at this point the informed buyer
chooses whether to reveal that he is informed to the seller. Since θ is “hard” and
“contractible” information, an informed buyer can pretend to be uninformed, while
an uninformed buyer cannot pretend to be informed.
The seller does not observe any of the realizations of Nature’s draws, but knows
the probabilities of each of the possible realizations. He accepts or rejects the contract
oﬀered by the buyer, calculating his expected utility using his beliefs (about Nature’s
draw) updated on the basis of the contract he has been oﬀered. The seller accepts the
contract if and only if the expected utility from it is at least as large as the expected
utility he gets from rejecting and proceeding to the “renegotiation” stage below.
Once the contract-negotiation is over, the buyer chooses a level of relationship-
speciﬁc investment e ∈ [0,1]. This increases the value of the widget to the buyer,
with the buyer incurring a cost as described in Subsection 2.4. At this stage the seller
observes the level of relationship-speciﬁc investment selected by the buyer.
The realized θ ad σ are then observed by both seller and buyer (of course the
informed buyer has nothing new to observe). Either party can take the contract to
court; if either does, the court decides whether to void it or uphold it according toShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 11
the announced rule.
If the court voids the contract, renegotiation occurs. As we mentioned above,
renegotiation is modelled as a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer from the seller to the buyer of a
price at which to trade. When renegotiation occurs, following the court’s decision to
void the contract, the parties’ outside options are represented by the payoﬀs associated
with no trade, which we normalize to zero.
Finally, trade occurs according to the terms of the original contract, if the court
decides to enforce it, or according to the terms of the renegotiated agreement, if the
court decides to void the original ex-ante contract.
3. A Candidate Equilibrium
We next describe a candidate equilibrium, which in the next section we show is the
unique equilibrium of the model for an open set of parameter constellations. This
equilibrium represents the case of interest, in which the court voids some contracts
that the parties would like to see upheld.
Recall that there is never any risk associated with θ = S, while the risk associated
with θ = R is in some sense commensurate with the diﬀerence cH − cL. Given that
the sellers are risk-averse, and that the risk associated with θ = R is uninsurable,
it is intuitively plausible to focus on the case in which the court rule — denoted by
C throughout the rest of the paper — would prescribe that a contract written by
uninformed buyers should be voided if θ = R and upheld if θ = S, while contracts
written by informed buyers should be upheld.
Given this court rule, informed buyers will separate because if they pool with the
uninformed buyers their contract will be voided with probability 1. Since the ex-post
renegotiation gives all the bargaining power to the seller this leaves them worse oﬀ
than if they separate, that is, write a contract that reveals their private informa-
tion. By separating their contract is enforced, and they receive the net beneﬁts of
their relationship-speciﬁc investment. We next characterize the candidate equilibrium
contracts when the court employs this rule and the informed buyers separate.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 12
We take ﬁrst the uninformed buyers. In general, the uninformed can specify two
prices in an ex-ante contract: pR and pS. These are prices at which to trade in each of
the {R,S} states. They can also specify an ex-ante up-front transfer from the buyer
to the seller t, and a “force majeure” clause that speciﬁes a set of values of θ, denoted
by F, in which they stipulate that performance will be excused. 13 The term “force
majeure” seems particularly apt in this context since the value of θ maps directly
into how large the change in cost and value are. Recall that the ex-ante contract, by
assumption, cannot be contingent on the realization of σ.
To sum up, an ex-ante contract for the uninformed buyers in our model can be
taken to be an array (p,t,F) = (pR,pS,t,F) that is interpreted as follows. The
parties agree to an immediate transfer t from the buyer to the seller. They also agree
to trade the widget at a price of pθ, provided that the state is θ 6∈ F. Finally, the
contract is void (the price pθ is not binding on either the buyer or the seller) if θ ∈
F ⊆ {R,S}.14
Recall that in our candidate equilibrium the court rule C prescribes that for the
uninformed contract, performance is excused whenever θ = R. So, at this stage the
relevant choice is whether to include S in F or not, and assuming S 6∈ F, at what
level to set pS and t.
If the uninformed specify that S 6∈ F, then pS and t must be the solution to
max
pS,t,eS
πS(eSY + ∆ + cS − pS) − t − ψ(eS)
s.t. πSV (ps − cS + t) + πRV (∆ + eSY + t) ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(eS) = πS Y
(3)
13If the parties’ contract invokes a “force majeure” clause that makes it not binding, we assume
that any trade is governed by ex-post renegotiation.
14Notice that, in the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1990), the buyer in our model is an
“informed principal in an environment of private values.” Maskin and Tirole (1990) in a diﬀerent
setting show that the use of menus of contracts aﬀect the set of possible equilibrium outcomes of
the signalling game. In our model the buyer is signalling not only to the seller but also the court.
Hence our model does not fall into the scope of the Maskin and Tirole (1990)’s analysis. For the
sake of simplicity in our analysis we do not consider the case in which the buyer can oﬀer a menu of
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From the ﬁrst order conditions, the solution to problem (3) is t = −eSY and pS =
cS+ ∆ + eSY . The uninformed buyer’s payoﬀ is
Π
S = eS Y − ψ(eS) > 0 (4)
If the uninformed specify S ∈ F their payoﬀ will be zero, since in this case
prices are always determined by ex-post renegotiation and the seller will appropriate
all surplus. Hence the uninformed buyer will select a level of relationship-speciﬁc
investment e = 0. The surplus will therefore be precisely ∆ in every state. Hence
to satisfy the seller’s participation constraint, the buyer will be left with an expected
proﬁt of zero. Hence the uninformed buyer will write a contract specifying that
S 6∈ F, t = −eSY and pS = cS + ∆ + eSY .
Notice that for the court rule that excuses performance in R for contracts written
uninformed buyers it is irrelevant whether the contract speciﬁes that R ∈ F or not.
In the actual equilibrium of the model that we will focus on in Section 4 below, this
will not be the case, however. When the parameters of the model are in the region of
interest, the decision to specify R ∈ F will be shown to be not robust in the sense that
it will not survive any trembles in the court’s decision. This is because, while it will
be optimal for the court to void the contract contingent on θ = R, the uninformed
would actually prefer (other things equal) the court to uphold it.
With this characterization of the contract for the uninformed buyers in our can-
didate equilibrium, it is straightforward to characterize the optimal behavior of the
informed buyers. Suppose they separate as the candidate equilibrium speciﬁes. The
contract that separating informed buyers oﬀer consists of a price at which to trade
pI, without the need to specify a separate up-front transfer.15 Since the candidate
15If the court upholds the contract of the separating informed buyers then the contract is upheld
with probability 1, hence there is no distinction (given no discounting) between money transferred
up-front and money transferred at the time of trade. If the court voids the contract of the separating
informed buyer, then the seller appropriates all the surplus ex-post. Hence the informed buyer will
select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment e = 0. The surplus will therefore be precisely ∆.
Hence to satisfy the seller’s participation constraint, the buyer will be left with an expected proﬁt
of zero. Therefore, the up-front transfer will be 0.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 14
equilibrium speciﬁes that their contract is upheld by the court, and no uncertainty
remains at the time it is signed it will simply specify pI = cH + ∆. Notice also that
since the court always enforces the contract in this case, the buyer will select a (“ﬁrst




Hence an informed buyer’s proﬁt when he separates is
Π
∗ = e
∗ Y − ψ(e
∗). (5)
If an informed buyer deviates from the candidate equilibrium and pools with the
uninformed, oﬀering the same contract as they do his proﬁt is
Π
P = −t = eSY. (6)
The contract will be voided by the court, and the buyer will keep the up-front transfer
speciﬁed in the contract oﬀered by the uninformed buyer. Ex-post the seller will
appropriate the surplus, and hence the informed buyer will select e = 0.
Notice that, since eS satisﬁes ψ0(eS) = πS Y , for πS suﬃciently small Π∗ > ΠP.
Therefore with the given court rule C the contract prescribed in the candidate equi-
librium is optimal for the informed buyer.
For completeness we need to describe the beliefs of the seller if he were to observe
a contract oﬀer by a buyer who “declares to be uninformed” that diﬀers from the
solution to problem (3). 16 For now it is suﬃcient to assume that the seller’s out-of-
equilibrium beliefs are that the oﬀer comes from an uninformed buyer with probability
1. We return to this issue in Subsection 4.2 below.
16Notice that there is no need to specify the beliefs of the seller if he observes another contract oﬀer
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4. Results
We will show that for an open set of possible conﬁgurations of parameters all equilibria
exhibit the same qualitative characteristics as the candidate equilibrium described in
Section 3. Under these parametric conditions all equilibria of the model have the
feature that the court does not always enforce what the contracting parties write.
In particular, given that in equilibrium the informed and uninformed separate, the
uninformed would prefer the court to enforce the contract they write in the risky
state. The court, on the other hand, maximizes the parties’ welfare behind a veil
of ignorance that covers the informed and uninformed buyers. It ﬁnds it optimal to
void the contract of the uninformed in the risky state, because this induces separation
between the informed and uninformed buyers.
Going from the candidate equilibrium of Section 3 to substantiating the claims
we have just made, one important step remains. In characterizing the equilibrium
above, we took the court’s rule as given. We must now show that the court’s optimal
rule is of the assumed form.
4.1. Preliminaries: The Extensive Form Game
Technically, our model is a three-player incomplete-information extensive-form game
which we designate by Γ throughout the rest of the paper.
To ease the exposition, we conﬁne a detailed description of Γ to the Appendix
(Section A.1), while here we limit ourselves to a brief discussion of those elements of
Γ that are essential to stating our results below.
A typical court rule will be denoted by C. As we have already discussed a court
rule is a map from the court’s information (the contract type, and the realization of
θ) into a decision to void or uphold the parties’ contract.
Recall that a contract between an uninformed buyer and the seller is of the form
(p,t,F) = (pR,pS,t,F). Of course a contract between an informed buyer who declares
to be uninformed is an object of exactly the same type. We let AU be the set of all
possible contracts of the form (p,t,F); a typical element of AU will be denoted byShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 16
aU. A contract between an informed buyer who declared to be informed, on the other
hand is an object of the type (pI,tI), where pI is the price of the widget, and tI is an
up-front transfer.17 We denote AI the set of all possible contracts of this type, with
aI a typical element of AI.
The payoﬀs of each player are straightforward. The buyer’s objective is expected
proﬁt. Since contracting takes place after the buyer’s type is realized, the informed
buyer maximizes his proﬁt, and the uninformed buyer maximizes his expected proﬁt.
The seller maximizes his expected utility, so he will accept a contract oﬀer if an only
if, given his updated beliefs, a contract guarantees an expected utility greater than
or equal to V (∆).18 Finally, since the seller’s equilibrium payoﬀ is ﬁxed at V (∆),19
the court maximizes the weighted sum of the expected proﬁt of the uninformed and
of the informed buyer, with weights 1 − γ and γ respectively.
4.2. Preliminaries: Equilibrium
We are interested in the Perfect-Bayesian Equilibria of Γ (from now on PBE). As
is common in models with asymmetric information, a large multiplicity of PBE can
be “bootstrapped” using a variety of oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs (of the seller in
our case). For example, suppose that the court follows the rule in which if enforces
all contracts regardless of the state. Consider the contracting game Γ that the par-
ties play after the court announces this rule. Suppose that the informed and the
uninformed buyers pool and oﬀer the seller a contract that leaves the seller with a
positive expected surplus. This may be part of a PBE if the seller’s beliefs are that
any out-of-equilibrium oﬀer is made by an informed buyer. A seller who held these
17In Section 3 we argued that when the court rule is to enforce this type of contract the distinction
between pI and tI is redundant. This is of course still the case. However, in the general case, before
we have determined the equilibrium behavior of the court, we must allow for the possibility that the
court rule will be to void such contract. Hence, in general, we must allow for a separate up-front
transfer tI.
18The seller’s reservation expected utility level is V (∆) because if he rejects the ex-ante contract
oﬀered by the buyer trade will take place ex-post. In this case the buyer’s investment will be 0 and
the seller will appropriate the entire surplus ∆ regardless of the realization of uncertainty.
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beliefs could reject an oﬀer at terms less favorable than the pooling oﬀer, since the
oﬀer might generate an expected loss under those beliefs.
The seller can guarantee himself a surplus of ∆ by rejecting all contracts, so that
transactions are negotiated ex-post when it is assumed that he has all the bargaining
power. Equilibria that leave the seller with expected surplus greater than ∆ when
the buyer is assumed to have all the bargaining power seem implausible. We follow
the usual strategy of applying a reﬁnement of the set of PBE equilibria that restricts
the set of allowed beliefs in order to restrict attention to those that are more plau-
sible. The reﬁnement we use is undefeated equilibria (Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Postlewaite 1993). Consider a proposed sequential equilibrium and an oﬀer by the
buyer that is not part of the proposed equilibrium. Suppose there is an alternative
equilibrium in which some non-empty set of buyer types make this oﬀer and that
that set is precisely the set of types who prefer the alternative equilibrium to the
proposed equilibrium. The test requires the seller’s beliefs at that oﬀer in the orig-
inal equilibrium to be consistent with this set. If the beliefs are not consistent, the
second equilibrium defeats the proposed equilibrium. For any court rule C, in any
undefeated perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the contract oﬀered to the seller will leave
him with expected surplus equal to ∆.
From now on we will focus exclusively on the set of Undefeated PBE of Γ, which
is denoted by UPBE.
4.3. Equilibrium Characterization
We state formally our main results next. The ﬁrst pins down the equilibrium outcomes
of our game under particular parametric restrictions. We postpone a discussion of
the parametric restrictions and their interpretation until after the statement of our
ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium Outcomes: Consider the extensive form game Γ of Sub-
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There exists a ˜ πS ∈ (0,1) and a ˜ q ∈ (0,1), and for every γ, γ ∈ (0,1) with γ < γ,
there exist a ˜ c > 0 such that whenever πS < ˜ πS, γ ∈ (γ, γ), cH − cL > ˜ c, and q < ˜ q
the following holds:
Any UPBE of Γ has the following properties.
(i) The informed and uninformed buyers separate, i.e., aU 6= aI;
(ii) Trade between the informed buyer and the seller is governed by a contract
which is enforced by the court and speciﬁes (pI,tI) satisfying pI + tI = cH + ∆;
(iii) If θ = S, trade between the uninformed buyer and the seller is governed by
a contract in AU which is enforced by the court and speciﬁes S 6∈ F, t = −eS Y and
pS = cS + ∆ + eS Y ;
(iv) If θ = R, the contract between the uninformed buyer and the seller is not
binding and hence the terms of trade are left to ex-post renegotiation.20
The ﬁrst restriction of the proposition is that πS should be below a particular
upper bound ˜ πS. The reason for this requirement is easy to explain in terms of the
candidate equilibrium described in Section 3. Note that we are claiming that the
informed buyers will ﬁnd it optimal to separate from the uninformed. If we take as
given that the court will uphold the contract, then the payoﬀ of the informed buyer
who separates is Π∗ = e∗ Y − ψ(e∗), as in (5). If the informed buyer pretends to be
uninformed, as we argued in Subsection 3, his proﬁt will be ΠP = eS Y , as in (6).
Hence, since eS Y is an increasing function of πS, which is 0 when πS = 0 and equal
to e∗ Y > e∗ Y − ψ(e∗) when πS = 1, we obtain Π∗ > ΠP if and only if πS is below
a given cut-oﬀ point.
The other parametric requirements of Proposition 1 are designed to capture the
following class of contracting problems. We need to focus on cases in which the risky
20Notice that at this point we are not specifying why ex-post renegotiation will prevail in this case.
Clearly, in general this could be either because the parties’ contract contains a “force majeure” clause,
or because the contract is voided by the court. In Proposition 4 we will argue that the latter is more
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state R is “not very risky” when the informed separate, but at the same time becomes
“very risky” when the informed pool with the uninformed.
Notice that the riskiness of θ = R is controlled by two parameters in our model.
Other things being equal, it is high when cH − cL is high and low when cH − cL is
low. Moreover, for a given level of cH − cL, the riskiness of state R is low when the
probability that the cost is cH is either close to 0 or close to 1. Conversely, for a given
level of cH − cL, the riskiness of θ = R is high when the probability that the cost is
cH is “in the middle,” towards 1/2.
When the informed buyer separates, conditional on θ = R, the seller’s updated
probability that the cost is cH is simply q. On the other hand, when the informed
buyer pretends to be uninformed, conditional on θ = R, the seller’s updated proba-
bility that the cost is cH is augmented by a factor that is increasing in γ.21
The rationale behind the parametric restrictions in Proposition 1 is now apparent.
If we ﬁx a value of γ ∈ (0,1) we can always ﬁnd a q suﬃciently low and a level of cH
− cL suﬃciently high so that the risk that the seller faces if pooling obtains is high,
but at the same time the risk he faces if the informed buyer separates is low.
So, why is the case of low risk with separation and high risk with pooling the
interesting one? The answer is that this is what pins down the equilibrium outcomes
described in Proposition 1, and the fact that the court must, in a sense to be discussed
shortly, be voiding some of the contracts that the parties write.
Suppose for a moment that the court simply upheld every contract in AU, and
that the uninformed buyer writes a contract without a force majeure clause (F =
∅). Then it is intuitively clear that the informed buyer would want to pool with
the uninformed because he knows that θ = R and σ = H. However the price pR in
this case will be “low” (in particular, lower than cH + ∆) to reﬂect the fact that,
conditional on θ = R, the seller’s updated probability that the cost is cL will be
“high” because of the pooling behavior of the informed and uninformed buyers. If cH
− cL is high, this eﬀect swamps other eﬀects and pooling will be preferred.
21The updated beliefs for the case of pooling are computed in (A.42) below.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 20
On the other hand in the case of pooling, conditional on θ = R, the seller will be
exposed to high risk, for which the uninformed buyer must compensate him. This
makes this option unattractive for the court which maximizes the weighted sum of the
informed and uninformed buyer’s expected proﬁt. Under the parametric restrictions
of Proposition 1, the court wants to induce separation in equilibrium to shelter the
uninformed buyer from the cost associated with the excessive risk that obtains under
pooling.
How can the court achieve separation in equilibrium? Under the parametric re-
strictions of Proposition 1, the court can only ensure that in equilibrium the informed
buyer separates from the uninformed by voiding contracts in AU when θ = R. To
see this, consider any candidate separating equilibrium in which the court upholds all
contracts in AU. Then, as we remarked above, the parametric conditions of Propo-
sition 1 ensure that, conditional on θ = R, any contract in AU will expose the seller
to low risk. It now follows that it is proﬁtable for the uninformed buyer to pro-
pose a contract that stipulates a price (as opposed to a “force majeure” clause) pR
for state R. This will be proﬁtable because the gain in incentives to undertake the
relationship-speciﬁc investment e will outweigh the (low) additional risk associated
with stipulating a price pR that the court will uphold as binding on the parties’ terms
of trade when θ = R. But once the uninformed buyer writes a contract that is binding
when θ = R the informed buyer will want to pool with the uninformed to buy the
widget at a low price.
Hence, if the court upholds contracts in AU when θ = R, separation cannot be
achieved in equilibrium. Thus, it is clear that an optimal court rule will not always
uphold what the contracting parties write.
In order to sharpen our focus on the court’s intervention in the parties’ contractual
relationship we put forth three further results. The ﬁrst sets a benchmark case of a
rule C consistent with a UPBE of Γ. This UPBE is essentially an expansion of the
candidate equilibrium discussed in Section 3 above.
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position 1, the following strategy proﬁle constitutes a UPBE of the extensive-form
game Γ.
The court upholds all contracts in AI and all contracts in AU, provided that θ =
S. If θ = R, the court voids all contracts in AU.
The informed buyer oﬀers the seller the separating contract t = 0 and pI = cH +
∆, which the seller accepts. The informed buyer undertakes the “ﬁrst-best” level of
relationship-speciﬁc investment e∗.
The uninformed buyer oﬀers the seller the following contract in AU, which the
seller accepts. There is no “force majeure” so that F = ∅. Moreover, t = −eS Y , pS
= cS + ∆ + eS Y , and pR is a number to be deﬁned below.22 The uninformed buyer
undertakes a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment equal to eS.
There are two features of this UPBE that we want to focus on. First, the court’s
rule C actually prescribes that some contracts will be voided. Second, the uninformed
buyer will oﬀer a contract that does not include a “force majeure” clause. Hence, the
court will actually intervene in equilibrium to void a contract that would otherwise
stand.
Our next two propositions clarify that these are necessary features of equilibria in
our model. The ﬁrst is in fact a feature of any UPBE. The second is a feature of any
UPBE that is robust in a sense described below.
Proposition 3. Necessity of Voiding by the Court: Under the parametric restricti-
ons of Proposition 1, any court rule C that is part of a UPBE of Γ has the following
property.
Any contract in AU that has no “force majeure” clause for the state R is voided
by the court when θ = R.
22In fact plugging in any value of pR will yield a UPBE together with the rest of the strategy
proﬁle we have just described. It is useful to consider the case in which pR is the solution to (7)
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Therefore, the court must intervene in the contractual relationship between buyer
and seller in our model. This is the only way to induce separation between informed
and uninformed buyers. The court, in turn, wants to achieve separation to enhance
ex-ante welfare.
Proposition 3 still leaves open the possibility that the parties, knowing that the
court will void their contract will in fact include a “force majeure” clause for θ = R
that replicates what the court would do in this case. However, it seems implausible
that the parties would include in their contract a (“force majeure”) clause that they
prefer not to be enforced. In particular, if there were some chance that the court
did not void the contract when θ = R, the parties would not include the clause. We
formalize this intuition next.
First we clarify what price pR the uninformed will include in any contract without
a “force majeure” clause. Consider the benchmark equilibrium of Proposition 2. The
price pR that “completes” this equilibrium, is not hard to compute. Recall that in
this equilibrium we have that pS = cS + ∆ + eSY , and t = −eSY , so that the seller’s
payoﬀ when θ = S is equal to ∆. It is then clear that the price pR that the uninformed
want to write in their contract “just in case” the court should enforce contracts in
AU when θ = R is the lowest that the seller will accept. This is easily computed as
the pR that solves
qV (pR − eS Y − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR − eS Y − cL) = V (∆) (7)
Formally, we assume that the court may make a mistake in implementing the
announcement it makes.23 A contract that should be voided according to the court’s
rule will be upheld with (vanishingly small) positive probability. Formally, the court’s
strategy set is modiﬁed as follows. The court’s information set remains the same,
but the court is now constrained to voiding the contract with probability greater or
equal to a small real number ε in every eventuality. For every ε > 0 this deﬁnes
23For simplicity we introduce noise only when the court voids contracts. The claims in Proposition
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a new incomplete-information extensive-form three-player game, Γ(ε). The set of
Undefeated PBE of Γ(ε) is denoted by UPBE(ε). We then say that a UPBE of Γ is
robust if it is the limit of any sequence of UPBE(ε) as ε tends to 0.
Our last formal claim shows that the court must intervene in equilibrium in any
robust UPBE of the game Γ.
Proposition 4. Robust Equilibria: Necessity of Court Intervention: Under the par-
ametric restrictions of Proposition 3, any court rule C that is part of any robust UPBE
of the extensive-form game Γ has the following properties.
(i) The uninformed buyer oﬀers a contract that contains no “force majeure” clause
(F = ∅).
(ii) The court rule C prescribes that the equilibrium contract between the unin-
formed buyer and the seller is void when θ = R.
5. Discussion
5.1. Interpretation of Bayesian Equilibria
We discussed in the introduction a motivation for evaluating welfare at the ex-ante
stage. At that point, the parties are symmetrically informed, and agreements can
be reached that avoid ineﬃciencies that are unavoidable at the interim stage when
the parties have private information. A court that maximizes the ex-ante expected
surplus will choose the same rule as the parties would have chosen at that stage,
were it possible. In other words, if the parties could meet at that point, they would
instruct the court to void some contracts they might subsequently write. They will
do this precisely because the parties will understand that while they may regret this
in some circumstances, it will have a salutary incentive eﬀect in other circumstances
that more than outweighs any negative eﬀect. It is in this sense that we say that the
court is acting precisely as the parties would want.
There is, however, and alternate interpretation of Bayesian equilibria. From a
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capture the fact that the seller is uncertain about what the buyer knows. The seller
does not know whether or not the buyer is informed, but he knows that the buyer does
know. While these two “types” of buyers – informed and uninformed – might in fact
be thought of as a single agent who might or might not have received information, the
alternative interpretation is that whether or not the buyer is informed or uninformed is
exogenously given, and the probabilities reﬂect nothing more than the seller’s inability
to distinguish the two types. In other words, there may never have been a time at
which the buyer did not have the relevant information, and consequently, never a time
at which the parties would have chosen the rule. When a court maximizes ex-ante
welfare, it is essentially averaging the beneﬁts and losses of the diﬀerent kinds of
buyers. In other words, a court that maximizes expected welfare amounts to making
interpersonal welfare judgements: it is setting a rule that will beneﬁt some at the
expense of others. The court in this case is essentially maximizing the welfare of the
agents “behind the veil of ignorance”.
5.2. Immutability of Court Rules
There are two distinct types of legal rules governing contracts: default rules that
the parties can contract around by prior agreement and immutable rules that cannot
be contracted around.24 Immutable rules can be justiﬁed if society wants to protect
contracting parties or if society wants to protect third parties. The ﬁrst justiﬁcation
is based paternalism, and thus, irrelevant in a model with fully informed and fully
rational actors. The protection of third parties can generally be thought of as rules
to ameliorate externalities that contracting parties may impose on others.25 Schwartz
and Scott (2003) argue that in the absence of traditional externalities courts should
not impose immutable rules on sophisticated parties (that is, parties that are fully
informed and capable of making rational decisions). We have identiﬁed an externality
qualitatively diﬀerent from traditional externalities, namely an informational exter-
nality. Our contracting parties may be uninformed, but are certainly sophisticated.
24The following discussion draws heavily on Ayres and Gertner (1989).
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They know what they do not know, and take this into account when they make deci-
sions. Yet, if the court enforces all contracts between sellers and uninformed buyers,
informed buyers have an incentive to masquerade as uninformed rather than disclose
their private information and contract accordingly. A rule that sometimes voids con-
tracts written by (seemingly) uninformed parties increases equilibrium information
disclosure, and is consequently eﬃciency enhancing. The parties whose contracts are
voided would contract around this rule if allowed, hence the rule must be immutable
to be eﬀective.
5.3. Common Law vs. Codiﬁed Law
We model the court as choosing the rules by which it interprets contracts at the initial
stage, prior to the time parties contract. As we discussed above, this captures in a
static model the dynamic process by which the court’s rulings over time create a set
of precedents that allows parties to forecast how contractual disputes will be resolved.
One can think of common law as evolving over time in this way. Alternatively, the
model can be interpreted as a model of codiﬁed law in which courts have no discretion
in resolving disputes, and only apply the rules that have been set forth in statutes.
In our model there is no diﬀerence between the rules that would be optimal in
a common law regime and those that would be optimal under codiﬁed law. A pair
of potential contracting parties meet, with the buyer randomly being informed or
not informed. We identify the ex-ante optimal choice of rule given the probabilities,
and it makes no diﬀerence whether that rule is embodied in statutory law or evolves
through the decisions that the court makes as it confronts repeated incarnations of
the parties, at least in the long run.
The situation is quite diﬀerent, however, if the set of contracting situations that
arise are not repetitions of the same problem, varying only in the particular realiza-
tions of the random variables. When the court confronts a particular dispute, any
investments the parties have made will be sunk, hence the decision the court makes
will have no eﬃciency consequences for the parties in that dispute; any eﬀect on in-
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parties in a contract may ﬁnd performance onerous due to intervening circumstances,
and ask the court to excuse performance. A court with discretion about interpreting
contracts may be tempted to provide ex-post insurance to that party, and attempt to
minimize the impact on future contracting parties by giving a very narrow argument
for why the contract was not enforced. Of course, when there is an accumulation
of a large number of highly speciﬁc circumstances under which contracts will not be
enforced, the parties will understand that it is likely that the contract will not be
enforced, even though they cannot forecast the courts’ reasoning for excusing perfor-
mance.26
Codiﬁed law provides a simple solution to this time inconsistency problem: it
commits to a particular interpretation of contracts, at least to the extent that it
limits judges’ ability to intervene in contractual relationships after investments have
been made. This advantage of codiﬁed law relative to common law comes at a cost
however. The advantage of codiﬁed law is that the rules by which contracts are
interpreted are set out prior to contracting. Subsequent to the choice of rules, but
prior to the time at which performance is called for under a contract, circumstances
may arise that were unforeseen at the time that the rules were codiﬁed. Moreover,
some of the circumstances may be such that, had they been foreseen, the optimal
codiﬁed rules would have excused performance when they arose. The advantage of
common law is precisely that it allows ex-post adjustments to the rules governing
contractual relationships.27
Appendix
A.1. The Extensive Form Game Γ
For completeness, in this Section we describe in full the three-player incomplete-information exten-
sive-form game Γ played by the court, the Buyer and the Seller that we introduced in Subsection
4.1 above.
Recall from Subsection 4.1 that AU denotes the set of all possible contracts of the form (p,t,F)
26We thank Steve Morris for this point.
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with typical element aU. Also AI denotes the set of all possible contracts of the type (pI,tI), with
aI a typical element.
The symbol A will denote AU × AI, with typical element a = (aU,aI).
The court can condition its decision to void or uphold on the realized value of θ and on the
contract type.28 We can obviously take the set of contract types to be T = {U,I}. Hence the
court’s “information set” is I = T × Θ.29
In summary, the court observes the type of contract and whether the state was risky or not,
and decides whether to uphold (U) or void (V) the parties’ contract on the basis of its observation.
Hence, the court’s rule is a map C : I → {V,U}. The set of all such possible rules is the court’s
strategy set, denoted by SC.
Given our notation it is clear that given a C, AU × [0,1] is the strategy set of the uninformed
buyer, while [AI ∪ AU] × [0,1] is the strategy set of the informed buyer (who can pretend to be
uninformed and oﬀer a contract in AU).30 We denote by ae
U a typical element of AU × [0,1] and
by ae
I a typical element of [AI ∪ AU] × [0,1]. So, given a C, a strategy for the buyer in the overall
Bayesian game is a pair ae = (ae
U,ae
I) of contracts to oﬀer and investment levels contingent on being
informed or uninformed. The set of all such pairs will be denoted by Ae. Since the buyer makes his
take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀer to the seller knowing the court’s rule C, a buyer’s strategy is a map
B : SC → Ae. The set of all such maps is the buyer’s strategy set, denoted by SB.
The strategy set of the seller, who is always uninformed, is straightforward: he decides to accept
(Y) or reject (N) the buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract. So, given a rule C and an a =
(aU,aI), the seller’s action set can be written as {Y,N} and a seller’s strategy is a map S : SC×A →
{Y,N}.31 The set of all such maps is the seller’s strategy set, denoted by SS.32
28See footnote 10 above.
29Notice that some elements of I are in fact automatically ruled out. This is because only informed
buyers can oﬀer contracts of type I. Hence if the court observes I it will automatically know that
θ = R (and σ = H).
30Recall that each type of buyer must select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment in [0,1] as
well as oﬀering a contract to the seller.
31Notice that we are including “redundant information” in the seller’s strategy set. This is because
the seller does not actually observe a, but only the contract that the realized type of buyer oﬀers. So,
the decision of the seller is contingent only the component of a that refers to the actual realized value
of η ∈ {U,I}. Taking this into account would only add to our notation. It is clear that perfection
ensures that this is irrelevant for our results.
32Notice also that, purely for the sake of simplicity, we omit any variables relating to the re-
negotiation stage (in case the contract is voided) from the description of the strategy sets of the
buyer and of the seller. Since whenever re-negotiation occurs the seller appropriates all the surplus
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Notice that the beliefs of the seller, in equilibrium will depend on the overall contract-oﬀering
strategy of the buyer a, and on the actual contract oﬀer o ∈ AU ∪ AI that he actually observes.
We will denote the updated beliefs of the seller concerning the realizations of θ and σ by ˆ πR(o,a),
ˆ πS(o,a), and ˆ q(o,a).33 We suppress the buyer’s strategy from the notation when no confusion will
result, and write the seller’s updated beliefs as ˆ πR, ˆ πS, and ˆ q.
This, together with the payoﬀs described in Subsection 4.1 above, completes the description of
the extensive form game Γ.
A.2. A Benchmark Maximization Problem
In this section we characterize the solution to a benchmark maximization problem, as a function of
some key parameters of our model. The results proved here will be used below to prove the claims
made in the text.
Notice that the analysis in this section can be thought of as a characterization of the opti-
mal contract between the uninformed buyer and the seller when the informed buyer separates, or
alternatively when the proportion γ of informed buyers is 0.
Lemma A.1: Consider the following problem:34
max
pS,t,eS
πS(eSY + ∆ + cS − pS) − t − ψ(eS)
s.t. πSV (ps − cS + t) + πRV (∆ + eSY + t) ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(eS) = πSY
(A.1)
Then the solution is unique, and satisﬁes t = −eSY and pS = vS + eSY = cS + ∆ + eSY . The
corresponding maximized value of the objective function is ΠS = eSY − ψ(eS) > 0.
Proof: The solution is entirely characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
V 0(pS − cS + t) = πSV 0(pS − cS + t) + πRV 0(∆ + eSY + t) (A.2)
together with the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.1) holding as an equality. Since (A.2) implies
pS −cS +t = ∆+eSY +t, using the constraint we get that pS −cS +t = ∆+eSY +t = ∆. From
this we obtain directly that t = −eSY and pS = vS + eSY = cS + ∆ + eSY , as required.
33When o is part of the proﬁle of equilibrium contracts oﬀered by the buyer, these beliefs, of
course, are obtained using Bayes rule.
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To see that the buyer’s expected proﬁt is as claimed we simply plug the solution back into the
objective function of problem (A.1). This gives a value of eSY − ψ(eS), which is positive since eS
is the solution to max
es∈[0,1]
πS eS Y − ψ(eS).
Lemma A.2: Consider the following problem
max
pR,t,eR
πR(eRY + ∆ + c − pR) − t − ψ(eR)
s.t. πSV (∆ + eRY + t) + πR [qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR + t − cL)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(eR) = πRY
(A.3)
and let the maximized value of the objective function be ΠR.
Consider also the problem
max
pR,pS,t,e∗ e∗Y + ∆ − t − ψ(e∗) + πS(cS − pS) + πR(c − pR)
s.t. πSV (ps − cS + t) + πR [qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR + t − cL)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(e∗) = Y
(A.4)
and let the maximized value of the objective function be ΠS,R.
Then ΠS,R > ΠR.
Proof: Let (˜ pR,˜ t,eR) be any solution to problem (A.3). Let ˜ pS = ∆ + eRY + cS. Notice next that
the array (˜ pR, ˜ pS,˜ t,e∗), because of the way we have set ˜ pS is feasible in problem (A.4). Substituting
these values in the objective function of problem (A.4) we get
e∗Y + ∆ − ˜ t − ψ(e∗) − πS(∆ + eRY ) + πR(c − ˜ pR) (A.5)
Since e∗ is chosen to maximize eY − ψ(e), it is clear that e∗Y − ψ(e∗) > eRY − ψ(eR). Hence the
quantity in (A.5) is greater than
eRY + ∆ − ˜ t − ψ(eR) − πS(∆ + eRY ) + πR(c − ˜ pR) = πR(eRY + ∆ + c − ˜ pR) − ˜ t − ψ(eR) (A.6)
However the right-hand side of (A.6) is precisely ΠR, namely the maximized value of the objective
function of problem (A.3). Therefore, we have found that the array (˜ pR, ˜ pS,˜ t,e∗) is feasible in
problem (A.4), and yields an expected proﬁt for the buyer that is larger than ΠR. This is clearly
enough to prove that ΠS,R > ΠR, as required.
Lemma A.3: Consider again problem (A.4). Then the solution only determines the values of pS+t
and pR + t, and of course e.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 30
If we ﬁx arbitrarily t = 0, then the solution to problem (A.4) is entirely characterized by ψ0(e∗)
= Y and by the two equations
V 0(p∗
S − cS) = qV 0(p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V 0(p∗
R − cL)
πSV (p∗
S − cS) + πR [qV (p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V (p∗





Proof: The claim that e∗ is determined as claimed requires no proof. To see that only pR + t
and pS + t are determined notice that if (pR,pS,t,e∗) is feasible in problem (A.4), then any array
(p0
R,p0
S,t0,e0) that satisﬁes p0
R +t0 = pR +t, p0
S +t0 = pS +t and e0 = e∗ is also feasible in problem
(A.4), and gives the buyer the same expected proﬁt.
To see that equations (A.7) determine the solution values for pR and pS when t = 0 simply notice
that the ﬁrst constraint in problem (A.4) must be binding, and that the ﬁrst of equations (A.7) is
a direct consequence of the Lagrangean ﬁrst-order conditions associated with problem (A.4).
Lemma A.4: Let ΠS,R be as in Lemma A.2 and ΠS be as in Lemma A.1. Deﬁne also
Φ(Y,πS) = [e∗Y − ψ(e∗)] − [eSY − ψ(eS)] (A.8)
Then
ΠS,R − ΠS = Φ(Y,πS) + ∆ + πS[cS − p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS)] + πR[c − p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS)] (A.9)
where Φ(Y,πS) is as in (A.8) and p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS) and p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS) are the solution to equations
(A.7).
Proof: From Lemma A.1 we know that ΠS = eSY − ψ(eS). From Lemma A.3 we know that
ΠS,R = e∗Y + ∆ − ψ(e∗) + πS[cS − p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS)] + πR[c − p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS)] (A.10)
The claim then follows directly from the deﬁnition of Φ(Y,πS) as in (A.8).
Proposition A.1: Let
e Π = max{ΠS,ΠR,ΠS,R,0} (A.11)
and denote again by p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS) and p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS) the solution to equations (A.7).
Then e Π 6= ΠR and e Π 6= 0. Moreover, if
Φ(R,πS) + ∆ + πS[cS − p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS)] + πR[c − p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS)] (A.12)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 31
is less than zero, then e Π = ΠS, if the quantity in (A.12) is greater than zero then e Π = ΠS,R, and if
the quantity in (A.12) is equal to zero then e Π = ΠS = ΠS,R.
Proof: From Lemma A.1 we know that ΠS > 0. Hence e Π 6= 0. From Lemma A.2 we know that
ΠS,R > ΠR. Hence e Π 6= ΠR.
The claim that whether e Π = ΠS or e Π = ΠS,R or both depends on the sign of (A.12) is a direct
consequence of Lemma A.4.






L) be given and denote again by
p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS) and p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS) the solution to equations (A.7). Assume that there exist two
constants x and y for which c00
H = c0
H + x, c00
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where c0 = qc0
H + (1 − q)c0
L and c00 = qc00
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S) + x. Plugging these equalities into (A.13) immediately proves the claim.
Lemma A.6: Fix a V function and all other parameters of problem (A.4), except for cL and cH.
Denote again by p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS) and p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS) the solution to equations (A.7).
Then for any B > 0 there exists a positive number A such that whenever cH − cL ≥ A
πS[cS − p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS)] + πR[c − p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS)] ≤ −B (A.14)
Proof: In view of Lemma A.5 we can restrict attention to the case in which cL = cS = 0 and cH
grows unboundedly large. Note that in this case c = qcH. Let p∗
R(cH) and p∗
S(cH) be the solution
to
V 0(p∗
S) = qV 0(p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V 0(p∗
R)
πSV (p∗
S) + πR [qV (p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V (p∗
R)] = V (∆)
(A.15)
It is enough to show that
πS[−p∗
S(cH)] + πR[qcH − p∗
R(cH)] (A.16)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 32
decreases without bound when cH increases without bound.




R(cH) − cH. Using the second of these inequalities, we can assert that
πS[cH − p∗
R(cH)] + πR[qcH − p∗
R(cH)] ≥ πS[−p∗
S(cH)] + πR[qcH − p∗
R(cH)] (A.17)
hence, rearranging the left-hand side of (A.17), it suﬃces to show that if we set z = πS + πRq < 1
then
p∗
R(cH) − z cH (A.18)
grows without bound as cH grows without bound.
Suppose now by way of contradiction that this is not the case. Let K be an upper bound for
the quantity in (A.18). Then, for every cH > 0
p∗
R(cH) − cH ≤ K − (1 − z)cH (A.19)
and hence we can conclude that our contradiction hypothesis implies that p∗
R(cH) − cH decreases
without bound as cH increases without bound. However, since V is bounded above and unbounded
below, for cH suﬃciently large this eventually contradicts the second equation in (A.15).
Lemma A.7: Fix a V function and all parameters of problem (A.4), including a pair cH > cL,
except for q.
Consider now
f(q) ≡ ∆ + πS[cS − p∗
S(q,cH,cL,cS)] + πR[c − p∗
R(q,cH,cL,cS)] (A.20)
Then f(0) = f(1) = 0 and f is continuous and quasi-convex over [0,1].
Proof: In view of Lemma A.5 we can restrict attention to the case in which cL = cS = 0 and cH >
0. Note that in this case c = qcH. Let p∗
R(q) and p∗
S(q) be the solution to
V 0(p∗
S) = qV 0(p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V 0(p∗
R)
πSV (p∗
S) + πR [qV (p∗
R − cH) + (1 − q)V (p∗
R)] = V (∆)
(A.21)
It is enough to show that
f(q) ≡ ∆ + πS[−p∗
S(q)] + πR[qcH − p∗
R(q)] (A.22)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 33
satisﬁes the required properties.
Notice that when q = 0 from (A.21) we know that p∗
R(0) = p∗
S(0) = ∆. Hence f(0) = 0.
Similarly, when q = 1 from (A.21) we know that p∗
R(1) − cH = p∗
S(1) = ∆. Hence f(1) = 0.
Continuity is obvious since f(q) is in fact diﬀerentiable by the implicit function theorem.
It remains to show that f is quasi-convex over [0,1]. Consider the problem
max
pR,pS
πS[−pS] + πR[qcH − pR]
s.t. πSV (ps) + πR [qV (pR − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR)] ≥ V (∆)
q ∈ [0,1]
(A.23)
It is enough to show that the maximized value of the objective function in (A.23) is quasi-convex
in q. Let g(p,q) be the objective function of problem (A.23) and O(q) be the opportunity set. Let
also g∗(q) = maxp∈O(q) g(p,q) be the maximized value of the objective function of problem (A.23).
Let two values q0 and q00 be given with q0 < q00 and q0, q00 ∈ (0,1). Let a number ξ ∈ (0,1) also
be given and let q = ξq0 + (1 − ξ)q00.
We need to show that g∗(q) ≤ max{g∗(q0),g∗(q00)}.
Notice that given that the constraint in problem (A.23) is in fact linear in q we have that O(q)





g(p,q) ≤ max{g∗(q0),g∗(q00)} (A.24)
which is enough to prove the claim.
Proposition A.2: As in Proposition A.1 let
e Π = max{ΠS,ΠR,ΠS,R,0} (A.25)
Fix a V function and all parameters of problem (A.4), except for cH and cL. Then there exists
a positive number A such that whenever cH − cL ≥ A then e Π = ΠS.
Now ﬁx a V , a pair cH and cL with cH−cL suﬃciently large, and all other parameters of problem
(A.4), except for q. Then there exist two numbers q0 < q00 in (0,1) such that when q ∈ (q0,q00) then
e Π = ΠS, when q ∈ [0,q0) ∪ (q00,1] then e Π = ΠS,R, and when either q = q0 or q = q00 then e Π = ΠS
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Proof: From proposition A.1 we know that e Π 6= ΠR and e Π 6= 0.




Now ﬁx a V and all parameters of problem (A.4) except for cH and cL. Since Φ(Y,πS) + ∆ is
independent of cH and cL, from Lemma A.6 and Proposition A.1 we know that there exists an A
such that whenever cH − cL ≥ A we have ΠS,R − ΠS < 0. Hence e Π = ΠS. This is clearly enough
to prove the ﬁrst assertion in the statement of the proposition.
Now ﬁx a V , all other parameters of problem (A.4) except for q, and ﬁx a pair cH and cL such
that for some q ∈ [0,1] we have that ΠS,R − ΠS < 0. Such pair must exist by the ﬁrst assertion of
the proposition we are proving.
Then by Lemma A.7 and Proposition A.1, since Φ(Y,πS) > 0 is independent of q, there must
exist some q0 and q00 ∈ (0,1) with q0 < q00 such that q ∈ (q0,q00) implies ΠS,R −ΠS < 0, q ∈ [0,q0) ∪
(q00,1] implies ΠS,R − ΠS > 0, and q equal to either q0 or q00 implies ΠS,R − ΠS = 0. This is clearly
enough to prove the claim.
A.3. Preliminaries
In this section we prove a set of preliminary results that will help us rule out many possible cases
in the proofs of our main results characterizing the set of UPBE of Γ below.35
Deﬁnition A.1: Recall that in a UPBE C is endogenously determined as the court rule that max-
imizes the expected payoﬀ of the court deﬁned in Subsection 4.1. Let an arbitrary C be given. This
clearly deﬁnes a two-player extensive-form game Γ(C) between the buyer and the seller in an obvious
way. In what follows we refer to a “UPBE given C” for Γ as a PBE of Γ(C) that gives the seller an
equilibrium payoﬀ of V (∆).
Lemma A.8: There exists no UPBE of Γ in which C prescribes that all contracts are voided.
Proof: If the court’s rule prescribes that all contract are voided, the court’s payoﬀ is zero.
Consider now a C that prescribes upholding contracts in AU if θ = S, voiding contracts in AU
if θ = R, and voiding contracts in AI.
Under this court rule, the informed buyer will select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment
that is equal to zero. This is because he knows that any contract (separating or pooling) he might
oﬀer the seller will in fact be voided.
35Recall from Subsection 4.2 that in any UPBE of Γ the seller’s payoﬀ is equal to V (∆).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 35
Fix any UPBE given C. Now let ˆ πS and ˆ πR be the updated beliefs of the seller, conditional on
observing the equilibrium contract oﬀer of the uninformed buyer. Let also z ∈ [0,1] be the seller’s
belief of having met a pooling informed buyer conditional on θ = R and on observing the equilibrium
contract oﬀer of the uninformed buyer. Then the equilibrium contract oﬀer of the uninformed buyer,
which the seller accepts, is the solution to
max
pS,t,eS
πS(eSY + ∆ + cS − pS) − t − ψ(eS)
s.t. ˆ πSV (ps − cS + t) + ˆ πR[zV (∆ + eSY + t) + (1 − z)V (∆ + t)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(eS) = πS Y
(A.26)
Using the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (A.26) it easily seen that the maximized value of its
objective function is greater than zero. Hence in any UPBE of Γ given C the uninformed buyer’s
expected payoﬀ is positive. Notice also that in any UPBE of Γ given C, the informed buyer’s payoﬀ
cannot be negative. This is simply because he can guarantee a payoﬀ of zero by oﬀering a separating
contract in AI. Hence the court’s payoﬀ in any UPBE of Γ given C is positive. This is enough to
prove the claim.
Lemma A.9: Let a C be given prescribing that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R, and that
all contracts in AU are upheld if θ = S. Then in any UPBE of Γ given C the uninformed buyers do
not include θ = S in F.
Proof: If the uninformed write a contract in AU that speciﬁes S ∈ F, since the court voids when θ
= R, their trade will be left to ex-post renegotiation with probability one. Hence their payoﬀ will
be zero.
If they write a contract in AU in which S 6∈ F, since the court will uphold such contracts, their
equilibrium contract oﬀer, which the seller will accept, is the solution to problem (A.26). Since the
maximized value of the objective function of this problem is positive, they will do so in preference
to a contract in AU with S ∈ F.
Lemma A.10: Let a C be given prescribing that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R, all
contracts in AU are upheld if θ = S, and all contracts in AI are upheld. Then there exists a ˜ πS ∈
(0,1) such that whenever πS < ˜ πS in every UPBE of Γ given C the informed buyers separate.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 36
Proof: By Lemma A.9 the uninformed buyers will write a contract in AU that speciﬁes S 6∈ F.
Separation yields the informed buyer a payoﬀ of e∗Y − ψ(e∗). By pooling, the informed buyer writes
a contract that he knows will be voided by the court. Hence his payoﬀ from pooling is −t, where t
is the up-front transfer in the equilibrium contract of the uninformed buyers.
First, we check that there is a UPBE of Γ given C in which the informed buyers separate. If
the informed buyers separate, then the uninformed buyers, in equilibrium, oﬀer a contract to the
seller, which the seller accepts, that is the solution to problem (A.1). Hence, from Lemma A.1, we
know that the up-front transfer in the equilibrium contract of the uninformed buyers is t = −eS Y .
Since for πS suﬃciently small it must be that e∗Y − ψ(e∗) > eS Y , this proves that the informed
buyers do in fact prefer to separate. This is enough to verify that there is a UPBE of Γ in which
the informed buyers separate.
We now need to argue that there are no UPBE of Γ given C in which a positive fraction of
informed buyers pool with the uninformed. By way of contradiction, suppose that one exists.
Notice that the informed buyers who pool with the uninformed select a level of relationship-speciﬁc
investment equal to zero since they know that their contract will be voided by the court. Hence their
payoﬀ in any such UPBE is −t where t is the up-front transfer in the equilibrium contract between
the uninformed buyers and the seller. It also follows that in any such UPBE the equilibrium contract
between the uninformed buyer and the seller solves problem (A.26). The solution to problem (A.26)
is entirely characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
ˆ πS
πS
V 0(pS − cS + t) = ˆ πSV 0(pS − cS + t) + ˆ πR[zV 0(∆ + eSY + t) + (1 − z)V 0(∆ + t)] (A.27)
plus the constraint of problem (A.26) holding as an equality.
Notice now that in any PBE of Γ we must have that ˆ πS ≤ πS. This is simply because, condi-
tionally on being informed the probability that θ = S is in fact zero. Using this fact and the fact
that V 0 is a decreasing function, we can use (A.27) to conclude that in any UPBE of Γ given C as
hypothesized we must have that
V 0(pS − cS + t) ≥ ˆ πSV 0(pS − cS + t) + ˆ πRV 0(∆ + eSY + t) (A.28)
From (A.28) it is immediate to conclude that pS − cS + t ≤ ∆ + eS Y + t. From this inequality,
using the constraint of problem (A.26) holding as an equality, it is now immediate to conclude that
in the solution to problem (A.26) we must have t ≥ −eSY .
Therefore, when πS is small enough to ensure that e∗Y − ψ(e∗) > eS Y , the payoﬀ to the
informed buyers from pooling must be smaller than their payoﬀ from separating. This implies that
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Hence, this is enough to prove the claim.
Lemma A.11: Let a C be given prescribing that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R, all
contracts in AU are upheld if θ = S, and all contracts in AI are upheld. Then there exists a ˜ πS ∈
(0,1) such that whenever πS < ˜ πS in every UPBE of Γ given C the court’s payoﬀ is given by
γ [e∗ Y − ψ(e∗)] + (1 − γ) [eS Y − ψ(eS)] (A.29)
Proof: Let ˜ πS be as in Lemma A.10. Then we know that in any UPBE of Γ given C the informed
buyers separate. Hence their equilibrium payoﬀ is e∗Y − ψ(e∗).
By Lemma A.9 the uninformed will write a contract in AU that speciﬁes S 6∈ F. Since the
informed buyers separate, the equilibrium contract between the uninformed buyers and the sellers
is the solution to problem (A.1). Hence, from Lemma A.1 we know that the equilibrium payoﬀ to
the uninformed buyers is eSY − ψ(eS). This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Lemma A.12: There exists a ˜ πS ∈ (0,1) such that whenever πS < ˜ πS the following holds.
If there exists a UPBE of Γ in which C prescribes that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R,
then it must also prescribe that all contracts in AI are upheld.
Proof: Let ˜ πS be as in Lemma A.10. Recall that by Lemma A.8 there is no UPBE of Γ in which
the court voids all contracts. Hence it is suﬃcient to show that there is no UPBE of Γ in which
the court upholds contracts in AU if θ = S and voids all other contracts. By contradiction, suppose
that there exists one such UPBE.
Notice that in the hypothesized UPBE, the informed buyers select a level of relationship speciﬁc
investment equal to zero. This is because they know that the court will void their contract (pooling
or separating as it might be). By Lemma A.9 the uninformed will write a contract in AU that
speciﬁes S 6∈ F. Hence, in the hypothesized equilibrium, the uninformed buyers select a level of
relationship-speciﬁc investment equal to eS.
Hence, the total expected (across informed and uninformed buyers) surplus from trade is equal
to
γ ∆ + (1 − γ) [∆ + eS Y − ψ(eS)] (A.30)
Since in any UPBE the payoﬀ to the (risk-averse) seller must be at least V (∆), (A.30) immediately
implies that the payoﬀ to the court in the hypothesized UPBE must be less than eSY − ψ(eS).
However, we know from Lemma A.11 that the court’s payoﬀ from adopting a rule C that upholds
contracts in AI, voids contracts in AU if θ = R and upholds contracts in AU if θ = S is as in (A.29).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 38
Since the quantity in (A.29) is greater than eSY − ψ(eS) we now have a proﬁtable deviation for the
court from the hypothesized UPBE. This concludes the proof.
Lemma A.13: There exists a ˜ πS ∈ (0,1) such that whenever πS < ˜ πS the following holds.
If there exists a UPBE of Γ in which C prescribes that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R,
then in this UPBE it must also be the case that S 6∈ F, and all contracts in AI are upheld, and that
all contracts in AU are upheld if θ = S.
Moreover, in any such UPBE the informed buyers separate and the court’s payoﬀ is given by
(A.29).
Proof: Let ˜ πS be as in Lemma A.10. From Lemma A.12 it is suﬃcient to show that there is no
UPBE of Γ in which C prescribes that all contracts in AU are voided if θ = R, all contracts in AI
are upheld, and all contracts in AU are voided if θ = S. By contradiction, suppose that there exists
one such UPBE.
Notice that in any such UPBE, since all contracts in AU are voided, regardless of θ, the unin-
formed buyers select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment equal to zero. The same is true of
any informed buyers who might pool. It then follows easily that the payoﬀ to all uninformed buyers
must be zero in such UPBE.
Since the informed buyers can get a payoﬀ of e∗ − ψ(e∗) > 0 by separating it follows that in
any such UPBE all informed buyers must in fact separate.
To sum up, the court’s payoﬀ in the hypothesized UPBE would be γ [e∗ − ψ(e∗)]. Since the
latter is less than the quantity in (A.29), it now follows that the court has a proﬁtable deviation
available: announcing the C described in Lemma A.11. This proves that any UPBE must be of the
form claimed.
The claim about the equilibrium payoﬀ to the court is a direct consequence of Lemma A.11.
Hence, the proof is now complete.
Lemma A.14: There exists a ˜ πS ∈ (0,1) such that whenever πS < ˜ πS the following holds.
If there exists a UPBE of Γ in which the uninformed write a contract with R ∈ F, then such
UPBE must also prescribe that S 6∈ F and that the court upholds all contracts in AI and all
contracts in AU if θ = S.
Moreover, in any such UPBE the informed buyers separate and the court’s payoﬀ is given by
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Proof: Since in the putative UPBE the uninformed buyers write a contract with R ∈ F, their trade
in this case is left to ex-post renegotiation, just as when the court voids contracts in AU when θ =
R. Hence, exactly the same argument that proves Lemma A.13 applies to prove the claim. We do
not repeat the details here.
Lemma A.15: Let a C be given that prescribes that all contracts in AU are upheld if θ = R. Then
in any UPBE given C the uninformed write a contract with S 6∈ F.
Proof: There are two cases to consider: the uninformed write a contract with R 6∈ F and S ∈ F,
and the uninformed write a contract with R ∈ F and S ∈ F. In both cases we will show that the
uninformed can gain by deviating and oﬀering a contract that speciﬁes S 6∈ F.
The latter case can be ruled out using exactly the same argument as in the proof of Lemma
A.14, and we do not repeat the details here.
Consider then a putative UPBE given C in which the uninformed write a contract with R 6∈ F
and S ∈ F . Then the equilibrium contract between the uninformed buyer and the seller, which the
seller accepts, is the solution to
max
pR,t,eR
πR(eRY + ∆ + c − pR) − t − ψ(eR)
s.t. ˆ πSV (∆ + eRY + t) + ˆ πR[ˆ qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − ˆ q)V (pR + t − cL)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(eR) = πR Y
(A.31)
where ˆ πS, ˆ πR and ˆ q are the updated beliefs of the seller, conditional on observing the equilibrium
contract oﬀer of the uninformed buyer.
Now, for given updated beliefs of the seller of course, consider a deviation from the part of the
uninformed seller to oﬀering a contract that speciﬁes S 6∈ F that solves
max
pR,pS,t,e∗ e∗Y + ∆ − t − ψ(e∗) + πS(cS − pS) + πR(c − pR)
s.t. ˆ πSV (ps + t − cS) + ˆ πR [ˆ qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − ˆ q)V (pR + t − cL)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(e∗) = Y
(A.32)
To conclude the argument, it is suﬃcient to show that the maximized value of the objective
function of problem (A.32) exceeds that of problem (A.31).
Let (˜ pR,˜ t,eR) be any solution to problem (A.31). Let ˜ pS = ∆ + eRY + cS. Notice next that the
array (˜ pR, ˜ pS,˜ t,e∗), because of the way we have set ˜ pS is feasible in problem (A.32). Substituting
these values in the objective function of problem (A.32) we get
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Since e∗ is chosen to maximize eY − φ(e), it is clear that e∗ − φ(e∗) > eRY − ψ(eR). Hence the
quantity in (A.33) is greater than
eRY + ∆ − ˜ t − ψ(eR) − πS(∆ + eRY ) + πR(c − ˜ pR) = πR(eRY + ∆ + c − ˜ pR) − ˜ t − ψ(eR) (A.34)
However the right-hand side of (A.34) is precisely the maximized value of the objective function of
problem (A.31). Therefore, we have found that the array (˜ pR, ˜ pS,˜ t,e∗) is feasible in problem (A.32),
and yields an expected proﬁt for the buyer that is larger than the maximized value of the objective
function of problem (A.31). This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Lemma A.16: There exists a ˜ cP such that whenever cH − cL > ˜ cP the following is true. Let a C
be given that prescribes that the court upholds all contracts in AU.
Then, if there is a UPBE given C in which the uninformed write a contract with R 6∈ F in such
UPBE the informed pool with the uninformed, and the uninformed write a contract with S 6∈ F.
Proof: By Lemma A.15 we know that in any UPBE given C, the uninformed write a contract with
S 6∈ F.
If the informed pool with the uninformed, the equilibrium contract between the uninformed
and the seller is the solution to problem (A.32). Let (pR,pS,t,e∗) be a solution to problem (A.32).
Notice that the sum pR + t is uniquely determined by the solution to the maximization problem.
Recall the uninformed buyer knows that θ = R and σ = H, and hence that the value, net of proceeds
from his relationship-speciﬁc investment is ∆ + cH. The payoﬀ to the informed buyer from pooling
can therefore be unambiguously written as
e∗Y + ∆ + cH − pR − t − ψ(e∗) (A.35)
The payoﬀ to the uninformed buyer if he deviates from the putative pooling equilibrium and separates
is zero if C prescribes that contracts in AI are voided and if C prescribes that contracts in AI are
upheld is
e∗ Y − ψ(e∗) (A.36)
Therefore showing that the quantity in (A.36) is less than the quantity in (A.35) is enough to
show that the informed do not want to deviate from the putative pooling equilibrium. So, we need
to show that ∆ + cH − pR − t > 0.
Notice that the solution to problem (A.32) is entirely characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
ˆ πS
πS
V 0(pS + t − cS) = ˆ πSV 0(pS − cS + t) + ˆ πR[ˆ qV 0(pR + t − cH) + (1 − ˆ q)V 0(pR + t − cL)] (A.37)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 41
together with the ﬁrst constraint of the maximization problem holding as an equality.
Suppose now that ∆ + cH − pR − t ≤ 0. Then, using the fact the V 0 is decreasing using (A.37)
we can conclude that
ˆ πS
πS
V 0(pS + t − cS) < ˆ πSV 0(pS − cS + t) + ˆ πR[ˆ qV 0(∆) + (1 − ˆ q)V 0(∆ + cH − cL)] (A.38)
Since 0 < ˆ πS ≤ πS and 0 ≤ ˆ q < 1, (A.38) implies that, as cH − cL grows without bound it must be
that V 0(pS+t−cS) approaches zero. Hence it must be that pS+t−cS approaches inﬁnity. However,
since ∆ + cH − pR − t ≤ 0 this makes it impossible to satisfy the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.32)
as an equality.
It now remains to rule out that in any UPBE under the given parametric conditions any positive
fraction of informed buyers might separate in equilibrium. The computations are virtually identical
to the ones we have just shown. In fact, when a positive fraction of informed buyers separate, the
contract that the uninformed sign with the seller is still the solution to problem (A.32) (the updated
beliefs need not be the same of course). Hence the argument we have just given is also suﬃcient to
show that the informed buyers will in fact want to deviate and pool with the uninformed.
Lemma A.17: There exists a ˜ cP such that whenever cH − cL > ˜ cP the following is true. Let a C
be given that prescribes that the court upholds all contracts in AU.
Then, if there is a UPBE given C in which the uninformed write a contract with R 6∈ F in such
UPBE the court’s payoﬀ is no greater than the maximized value of the objective function of the
following problem
max
pR,pS,t,e∗ e∗Y + ∆ − t − ψ(e∗) + (1 − γ)[πS(cS − pS) + πR(c − pR)] + γ(cH − pR)
s.t. (1 − γ)πSV (pS + t − cS)+
(1 − γ){πR [qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR + t − cL)]}+
γ(pR + t − cH) ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(e∗) = Y
(A.39)
Proof: Let ˜ cP be as in Lemma A.16. Using Lemma A.16 and Lemma A.15 we only need to consider
a pooling equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer writes a contract with F = ∅ and the court
enforces all contracts in AU.
Hence in the putative UPBE both the informed and the uninformed buyer select a level of
relationship-speciﬁc investment equal to e∗. It follows that if (pS,pR,t) are in fact the prices and
transfer of the equilibrium contract written by the uninformed buyer with the seller, then plugging
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The equilibrium contract between the uninformed buyer and the seller in the putative UPBE is
given by any solution to the following problem.
max
pR,pS,t,e∗ e∗Y + ∆ − t − ψ(e∗) + πS(cS − pS) + πR(c − pR)
s.t. (1 − γ)πSV (ps + t − cS)+
(1 − γ){πR [qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR + t − cL)]}+
γV (pR + t − cH) ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(e∗) = Y
(A.40)
Notice that, again, the solution to problem (A.40) determines uniquely the sums pS +t and pR +t,
but not the actual prices and up-front transfer.
The solution to problem (A.40) is entirely determined by the ﬁrst order condition
(1 − γ)(1 − πS) V 0(pS + t − cS) = [(1 − γ)πR + γ]·

(1 − γ)πRq + γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ
V 0(pR + t − cH) +

1 −
(1 − γ)πRq + γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ

V 0(pR + t − cL)
 (A.41)
together with the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.40) holding as an equality.
Since the constraints in problems (A.39) and (A.40) are in fact the same, it now follows that the
equilibrium payoﬀ of the court in the putative UPBE is the solution to problem (A.39) with (A.41)
imposed as an additional constraint.
Hence the equilibrium payoﬀ of the court cannot be greater than the maximized value of the
objective function in problem (A.39).
Lemma A.18: For every γ, γ ∈ (0,1) with γ < γ and every ˜ qB ∈ (0,1) there exist a ˜ cB > 0 such
that whenever γ ∈ (γ, γ), cH −cL > ˜ cB and q < ˜ qB, the maximized value of the objective function
of problem (A.39) is less than eSY − ψ(eS), which in turn is less than the quantity in (A.29).
Proof: Notice ﬁrst of all that problem (A.39) is in fact a re-parameterized version of problem (A.4)
in the following sense. If in problem (A.4) we replace πS with ˆ πS, πR with ˆ πR, and q with ˆ q where
ˆ πS = (1 − γ)πS ˆ πR = (1 − γ)πR + γ ˆ q =
(1 − γ)πRq + γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ
(A.42)
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Now ﬁx the arbitrary γ, γ and ˜ qB ∈ (0,1) of the statement of the Lemma. Notice that if we
know that q < ˜ qB and γ ∈ (γ, γ), from (A.42) we immediately know that
γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ
≤ ˆ q ≤
(1 − γ)πR˜ qB + γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ
(A.43)
and
(1 − γ)πS ≤ ˆ πS ≤ (1 − γ)πS and (1 − γ)πR + γ ≤ ˆ πR ≤ (1 − γ)πR + γ (A.44)
Let P be the set of (ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q) that satisﬁes the restrictions in (A.43) and (A.44).
Using Proposition A.2, for every ˆ πS, ˆ πR and ˆ q we can now choose an A(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q) such that the
maximized value of the objective function of problem (A.39) is less than ΠS = eSY − ψ(eS) if cH
− cL ≥ A(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q).
The claim that eSY − ψ(eS) is less than the quantity in (A.29) requires no proof.
Hence if we let ˜ cB be equal to the supremum over P of A(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q), the Lemma is proved.
Lemma A.19: For every γ, γ ∈ (0,1) with γ < γ and every ˜ qB ∈ (0,1) there exist a ˜ c > 0 such
that whenever γ ∈ (γ, γ), cH − cL > ˜ c and q < ˜ qB the following is true. Let a C be given that
prescribes that the court upholds all contracts in AU.
Then in any UPBE given C the uninformed write a contract with R ∈ F.
Proof: Fix the arbitrary γ, γ and ˜ qB ∈ (0,1) of the statement of the Lemma.
Consider now ˜ cP as in Lemma A.16. As is clear from the proof of Lemma A.16 the value of ˜ cP
depends on πS, ˆ πS, ˆ πR and ˆ q of equations (A.37) and (A.38). Keeping πS ﬁxed, let ˜ cP(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q)
be the value of ˆ cP yielded by Lemma A.16 as a function of the updated seller beliefs. Notice that
˜ cP(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q) is well deﬁned provided that 0 < ˆ πS < 1 and 0 ≤ ˆ q < 1. Since in Lemma A.16 we
have to allow for any fraction of informed buyers to pool in the beliefs of the seller, it follows from
Bayes’ rule that if γ ∈ (γ, γ) and q < ˜ qB, then
0 ≤ ˆ q ≤
(1 − γ)πR˜ qB + γ
(1 − γ)πR + γ
(A.45)
and
(1 − γ)πS ≤ ˆ πS ≤ πS and πR ≤ ˆ πR ≤ (1 − γ)πR + γ (A.46)
let Q be the set of (ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q) that satisfy the restrictions in (A.45) and (A.46).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 44
Now let the ˜ c of the statement of the present Lemma be deﬁned as
˜ c = max
(
˜ cB, sup
(ˆ πS,ˆ πR,ˆ q)∈Q
˜ cP(ˆ πS, ˆ πR, ˆ q)
)
(A.47)
where ˜ cB is as in Lemma A.18.
Suppose that the claim is false and consider a putative UPBE in which the uninformed write a
contract with R 6∈ F. Since ˜ c is as in (A.47), from Lemma A.16 we know that in the putative UPBE
it must be that the informed pool with the uninformed, and the uninformed write a contract with
S 6∈ F.
Hence, the payoﬀ to the uninformed in the putative UPBE is the maximized value of the objective
function of problem (A.40), and the equilibrium contract of the uninformed is determined by the
ﬁrst order conditions (A.41) and the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.40) holding with equality.
Since in the putative UPBE the informed prefer to pool with the uninformed than to separate
we know that their payoﬀ from pooling is greater than their payoﬀ from separating. Hence we get
e∗ Y − ψ(e∗) + +∆ − t + cH − pR > e∗ Y − ψ(e∗) + +∆ − t (A.48)
Notice now that (A.48) together with the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.40) and the concavity of V
implies that
πS(cS − pS) + πR(c − pR) < cH − pR (A.49)
Inequality (A.49) implies that if we substitute the solution to problem (A.40) into the objective
function of problem (A.39) we obtain a quantity that is greater than the maximized value of the
objective function of problem (A.40). Hence since the constraints in the two problems are the same,
we can now conclude that the maximized value of the objective function of problem (A.39) is greater
than the maximized value of the objective function of problem (A.40).
Since the maximized value of the objective function of problem (A.40) is the payoﬀ to the
uninformed in the putative UPBE, using the way we have chosen ˜ c in (A.47) and Lemma A.18, it
now follows that the uninformed have a proﬁtable deviation in writing a contract with R ∈ F which
gives them a payoﬀ of eSY − ψ(eS). This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 1
Let ˜ πS be as in Lemma A.10. Fix an arbitrary pair γ, γ ∈ (0,1) with γ < γ, and an arbitrary ˜ q ∈
(0,1). Let ˜ c be as in Lemma A.19.
We proceed by considering two mutually exclusive cases that exhaust all possibilities. First, a
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prescribes contracts in AU are upheld when θ = R.
In the ﬁrst case, we know the following about any UPBE given C. Using Lemma A.13, it must
be that the uninformed buyers write a contract with S 6∈ F, all contracts in AU are upheld if θ =
S, all contracts in AI are upheld, the uninformed buyers separate and the court’s payoﬀ is given by
(A.29).
In the second case, we know the following about any UPBE given C. Using Lemma A.19 and
Lemma A.14, it must be that the uninformed write a contract with R ∈ F and S 6∈ F. All contracts
in AU are upheld if θ = S, all contracts in AI are upheld, the uninformed buyers separate and hence
the court’s payoﬀ is given by (A.29).
Notice that the court is therefore indiﬀerent between a C as in the ﬁrst or in the second case
above. It may therefore want to randomize between two rules, one that upholds all contracts, and
one that voids contracts in AU if θ = R and upholds all other contracts. Since the contracting
parties observe the realized C before contracting, depending on the realization of the court’s draw,
the UPBE in the two cases is still as described above.
To complete the argument, we check that in both cases the claims made in Proposition 1 hold
both in the ﬁrst and in the second case above. Clearly (i) is veriﬁed since in both cases the informed
buyers separate. In both cases the court upholds the separating contract of the informed, and hence
(ii) is true. Since in both cases the contract of the uninformed speciﬁes S 6∈ F and is upheld by the
court when θ = S, claim (iii) follows from Lemmas A.13 and A.14. Claim (iv) follows directly from
the fact that in the ﬁrst case the court voids contracts in AU when θ = R, and in the second case
the uninformed write a contract with R ∈ F.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2
Given the proof of Proposition 1 the claim is virtually immediate. If the court voids contracts in
AU when θ = R, the uninformed can write either a contract with R ∈ F or one with R 6∈ F without
altering any of the equilibrium payoﬀs.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the claim is false. Then, using Proposition 1, it suﬃces to rule out the following type
of UPBE.
The court rule C enforces contracts in AI and contracts in AU if θ = S. Moreover if θ = R,
C enforces contracts in AU that have F = ∅, and the uninformed, in equilibrium, write a contract
with R ∈ F.
Of course, in the putative UPBE, as required by Proposition A.4, the informed separate, and
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Consider now a deviation from the part of the uninformed to oﬀering a contract with F = ∅
that solves problem A.4. This contract (by the contradiction hypothesis) will be upheld by the court
regardless of θ. Given the (population) beliefs of the seller it will be accepted, and hence will yield
the uniformed buyer a payoﬀ of ΠS,R as in Lemma A.2. However, if q > 0 is suﬃciently small we
know from Proposition A.2 that ΠS,R > ΠS. Hence, what we have described is a proﬁtable deviation
from the putative UPBE from the part of the uninformed. Hence the proof is complete.
A.7. Proof Proposition 4
We start by observing that by standard arguments, the set of robust UPBE is (weakly) contained
in the set of UPBE of Γ. This immediately implies that any robust UPBE of Γ must satisfy the
requirements of Propositions 1 and 3. Hence, we only need to rule out a robust UPBE in which
the uniformed oﬀer a contract with R ∈ F and which is otherwise precisely the simple equilibrium
described in Proposition 2. By way of contradiction, suppose that there is a robust UPBE of Γ as
we have just described.
Now consider a deviation from the part of the uninformed buyer to oﬀering a contract in AU




(πS + επR)(ˆ eY + ∆) + πS(cS − pS) + επR (c − pR) − t − ψ(ˆ e)
s.t. πSV (pS + t − cS) + (1 − ε)πRV (∆ + ˆ eY + t)
+επR [qV (pR + t − cH) + (1 − q)V (pR + t − cL)] ≥ V (∆)
ψ0(ˆ e) = (πS + επR)Y
(A.50)
The contract (ˆ pS, ˆ pR,ˆ t) is entirely characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions
V 0(ˆ pS − cS + ˆ t) = V 0(∆ + ˆ eY + ˆ t) = q V 0(ˆ pR + ˆ t − cH) + (1 − q)V 0(ˆ pR + ˆ t − cL) (A.51)
together with the ﬁrst constraint of problem (A.50) holding with equality.
For a given ε, consider the optimal contract the buyer oﬀers the seller, following the deviation,
when q = 0. The ﬁrst order conditions (A.51) imply that ˆ pR = ˆ eY + ∆ + cL, ˆ pS = ˆ eY + ∆ + cS
and ˆ t = −ˆ eY . Therefore, following the proposed deviation the buyer’s payoﬀ is
Πε = ˆ eY − ψ(ˆ e) (A.52)
From Proposition 1, if the uninformed buyer follows the prescription of the putative UPBE and
oﬀers the optimal contract with R ∈ F his payoﬀ is eS Y − ψ(eS). However, by inspection of theShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 47
second constraint in problem (A.50) and of the second constraint in problem A.1, it is immediate
that the quantity in (A.52) is greater than eS Y − ψ(eS).
Hence, by continuity, if q and ε are suﬃciently small, the uninformed buyer has a proﬁtable
deviation from the putative UPBE of Γ(ε) to oﬀering a contract in which F = ∅. Hence the proof
is now complete.
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